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Introduction 
Bri tish soldiers first came to Afghanistan in 1839, hoping to extend the Em-pire and counter growing Russian influence there. That four-year conflia 
ended in the massacre of most of the retreating British force of 16,500. demonstrat-
ing that, while Afghanistan could be conquered, holding it was another thing. In 
1878, again fearing Russian influence in the region, England once more invaded 
Afghanistan from its base in India. Britain's early vietol)' and regime change nearly 
proved Pyrrhic. With their occupation unexpectedly costly in men and treasure, the 
English gained control of Afghan foreign policy, then withdrew most of their forces 
to India. In 1919, when remaining British units were attacked by Afghan forces, the 
British initiated a third foray into Afghanistan, this one more successfu] than the 
prior two adventures. Afghanistan nevertheless gained its independence in 1921. 
Reminiscent of the British incursions into Afghanistan. from 1978 to 1992 the 
Soviet Union sponsored an armed conflict between the communist Afghan gov-
ernment and anti-communist Muslim guerrillas. For their trouble, the Russians 
learned the grim lesson of the Kipling poem, "Young British Soldier": "When 
you're wounded and left on Afghanistan's plains. And the women come out to cut 
up what remains, Jest roll to your rifle and blowout your brains, An' go to your 
Gawd like a soldier .. .. " 
• Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
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Now, prepared to overcome history with modern weapons and new tactics, the 
United States is in the seventh year of its war in Afghanistan. Challenges abound. It 
is a nation of massive mountain ranges and remote valleys in the north and east, 
with desert-like conditions on the plains to the south and west. Road and rail sys-
tems remain minimal and many of those that do exist are in disrepair. About the 
size of Texas, Afghanistan has a population of around twenty-four million. Now it 
has a visiting military population embedded in the International Security Assis-
tance Force (ISAF) numbering about 45,000 ground personnel, including 15,000 
US troops, with another 19,000 US troops assigned to Joint Task Force 101, a part 
of Operation Enduring Freedom forces assigned to Afghanistan. I 
This article offers a summary examination of some of the law of armed conflict 
(LOAC) issues encountered in US ground combat in Afghanistan. These issues 
were discussed during the June 2008 Naval War College workshop, "The War in 
Afghanistan," which was the genesis of this volume of the "Blue Book." Although 
it is a conflict whose ending remains to be written, much of its LOAC outlines are 
already discernable. Difficult issues involving conflict and individual status, ques-
tions about prisoner of war (POW) status, arguments regarding targeted killing 
and "direct participation," the questionable deportation of individuals from Af-
ghanistan to Guantanamo Bay, and a disturbing number of war crime allegations 
all arose in workshop discussions of ground combat in Afghanistan. This summary 
account reflects a few of those issues as seen through the lens of one participant. 
Not all attendees will agree with all of these assessments, but they provide depar-
ture points for discussion at fu ture workshops. 
A nned Conflict Commences 
The genesis of America's war in Afghanistan is well known. Long before the attacks 
of September 11,200 I , the United States was concerned with the direction taken by 
Afghanistan, as the Department of State's Coordinator for Counterterrorism said 
in a 1999 Senate hearing: 
Afghanistan has become a new safehaven for terrorist groups. In addition to bin Ladin 
and al-Qa'ida, the Taliban play host to members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the 
Algerian Armed Islamic [GJroup, Kashmiri separatists, and a number of militant 
organizations from Central Asia, including terrorists from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. 2 
After the 9-1 1 attacks, President George W. Bush demanded that Afghanistan 
dose its terrorist camps and hand over al Qaeda leaders in hiding there.3 As Profes-
sor Dinstein points out, an ultimatum from one government to another, setting a 
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deadline and warning that war will immediately commence once the deadline 
lapses, will, at the designated time, indicate the initiation of armed conflict. Al-
though there was no deadline in the Bush demand, it was dear that the Taliban 
were required to act immediately or armed conflict wouJd be initiated by the 
United States.4 Such was the case. "[US] military operations against Taliban and Al 
Qaeda targets in Afghanistan commenced on October 7th .... There ought to be no 
doubt that October 7th-and not September 11 th-is the date of the beginning of 
the war between the United States and Afghanistan."s In support of the American 
initiation of armed conflict, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolu-
tion 1386, authorizing establishment of an International Security Assistance Force 
to maintain security in and around Kabul, after the fall of the Taliban. States partic-
ipating in the ISAF were authorized "to take all necessary measures to fulfil its 
mandate."6 
Shifting Conflict Status 
From the outset, a unique aspect of the ground war in Afghanistan has been the 
heavy use of Special Forces: 
Army Special Forces (SF) was tested to a degree not seen since the Vietnam WaI. With 
little time to prepare for this mission, SF teams were to land by helicopter deep in 
hostile territory, contact members of the Northern Alliance, coordinate their activities 
in a series of offensives . . . and change the government of Afghanistan so that the 
country was no longer a safe haven for terrorists.1 
Army SF units were the first US military personnel in Afghanistan for Operation 
Enduring Freedom, as the invasion was denominated. A first twelve-man SF team 
was inserted on October 19,2001, joining with a Northern Alliance Uzbek com-
mander, Abdul Rashid.8 SF forces would carry the brunt of US fighting for the brief 
Common Article 29 period of the Afghan conflict. The Northern Alliance (the 
United Islamic Front fo r the Salvation of Afghanistan ) had battled the Taliban gov-
ernment since the Alliance's formation in 1996, in a non-international armed con-
flict. Now, in the north of Afghanistan,SF/Northern Alliance operations took place 
near Mazar-e Sharif, Kondoz and Taloqan . In other areas the Northern Alliance 
contin ued its independent conflict with the Taliban central government. 
Meanwhile, in the south of Afghanistan, on the night of October 19-20, an in-
ternational armed conflict opened when US SF and Ranger forces made a night-
time parachute drop to initiate a raid on Kandahar, fighting Taliban units. 
Common Article 2 and Common Article 310 conflicts were being fo ught at the 
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same time in a single country. "The fact that a belligerent State is beset by enemies 
from both inside and outside its terri tory does not mean that the international and 
internal armed conflicts necessarily merge."ll A few weeks later, on November 13, 
with the capture of Kabul by Northern Alliance, US and Bri tish forces, the interna-
tional armed conflict began to ebb, but significant LOAC issues were beginning to 
emerge. 
Individual Status and Prisoner of War Issues 
The US Army's official history of Operation Enduring Freedom notes, "At this 
point the wholesale surrender of the Taliban forces began to cause problems."12 
More than 3,500 Taliban fighters had surrendered around Kondoz. Several thousand 
more were captured by Northern Alliance forces near Mazar-e Sharif. Douglas 
Feith, then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, writes, "The Pentagon's leader-
ship appreciated the importance of honoring the Geneva Conventions, but issues 
arose time and again that required the very difficult balancing of weighty but com-
peting interests: on interrogation methods . . . and on whether to prosecute indi-
viduals as criminals or simply continue to hold them as enemy combatants."13 US 
efforts to "balance" the Geneva Conventions against interrogation methods and 
prosecution choices did not meet with notable success. 
What was the status of Taliban captives taken in the brief Common Article 2 
phase of the armed conflict? Did they qualify as POWs? Were they members of the 
armed forces of a party to the conflict? Additional Protocol I defines an armed force 
to include 
all organized armed fo rces, groups and units which are under a command responsible 
to that Party fo r the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a 
government or an authority not recognized by an adverse party. Such armed forces 
shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce 
compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict l~ 
Considering that definition, but for their compliance with international law, the 
Taliban appear to qualify as the anned forces of Afghanistan, entitled to POW status 
if captured in a Common Article 2 conflict. IS 
Or were Afghanistan's Taliban akin to a post-World War I Freikorps in defeated 
Germany? Consisting of private paramilitary groups, ultraconservative and highly 
nationalistic, more than sixty Freikorps proliferated throughout Germany in 19 19, 
one of them becoming the National Socialist German Workers' Party-the Nazi 
Party. But in 1920 the Nazis were just another Freikorps, with an allegiance not to 
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any German government but to their own Freikorps.16 There is an argument that 
Afghanistan's armed forces ceased to exist after the fall of the communist 
Najibullah government in September 1996 and were supplanted by rival Freikorps-
like "armies," the Taliban being one of the more powerful. The argument contin-
ues that there is no showing that the Taliban became the armed forces of Afghani-
stan, professing allegiance to the government of the State.11 The CommerJtary on 
the Additional Protocols notes, "[ Clombatant status is given to regular forces only 
which profess allegiance to a government or authority ... which claims to represent 
a State which is a Party to the conflict. "I! Accordingly, under this construct the 
Taliban were not "the armed forces of a Party to the conflict."19 Rather, the argu-
ment goes, they were merely the armed group in control of Afghanistan and its 
government. 
But the stronger case is that the Taliban were indeed the armed forces of Af-
ghanistan. Starting in 1954, the International Law Commission (ILC) developed 
guidelines for State responsibility. Article 8 of the liC's 200 1 document, Responsi-
bility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, reads: "The conduct of a person 
or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under intemationallaw if 
the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the 
direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct."2o That guidance, 
combined with the plain language of Additional Protocol I's Article 43.1, leads to 
the conclusion that the Taliban were the armed forces of Afghanistan. 
Accepting, arguendo, that the Taliban were Afghanistan's armed forces during 
the period of the Common Article 2 conflict, did its captured fighters merit POW 
status as members of "the armed forces of a Party to the conflict"?21 Applying the 
four conditions for lawful combatancy and POW status upon capture, the answer 
is reasonably clear: although they were the armed forces of Afghanistan, they did 
not wear uniforms or other distinctive fixed sign. Black turbans, common to many 
males in the region, do not suffice. 
Since the [four ) conditions are cumulative, members of the Taliban forces failed to 
qualify as prisoners of war under the customary law of war criteria. These criteria admit 
no exception, not even in the unusual circumstances of . .. the Taliban regime. To say 
that '[t)he Taliban do not wear uniforms in the traditional western sense' is quite 
misleading, for the Taliban forces did not wear any uniform in any sense at all ... . 22 
Throughout the Common Article 2 phase of the conflict they failed to distin-
guish themselves and were not entitled to POW status. Although there are rea-
soned views in disagreement,23 the Taliban captured during the Common Article 2 
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US invasion were not merely soldiers out of uniform-or out of a Western concep-
tion of a uniform. They were not POWs. 
What then was their status? Given the definition of civilians in Article 50 of Ad-
ditional Protocol I, they were simply civilians and, being directly involved in an in-
ternational armed conflict, they were unprivileged belligerents, i.e., civilians who 
took a direct part in hostilities, to be captured and tried under military or Afghan 
domestic law-not for being unlawful combatants, which is not a crime in and of 
itself, but for the unlawful acts that rendered them unlawful combatants. 
One may question whether it would not have been wise to have a competent tri-
buna! determine the status of those Taliban captured during the international 
phase of the conflict since their presumptive status upon capture was POW.24 But 
such tribunals are called for only in cases of doubt regarding the captive's status. 
Was there doubt?25 The US Congressional Research SelVice specifies several rea-
sons for not granting POW status: 
The Administration has argued that granting tal Qaeda or TalibanJ detainees POW 
status would interfere with efforts to interrogate them, which would in turn hamper its 
efforts to thwart further attacks. Denying POW status may allow the Army to retain 
more stringent security measures . ... The Administration also argued that the 
detainees, if granted POW status, would have to be repatriated when hostilities in 
Afghanistan cease, free ing them to commit more terrorist acrs.26 
Initially the US position on the status of both the Taliban and al Qaeda was 
seemingly based on such faulty reasoning. Clearly a! Qaeda, a violent , transna-
tional, non-State terrorist group, is in violation of all law, including the LOACP 
Acts of terrorism like those commonly perpetrated by a! Qaeda are prohibited by 
Geneva law, including the 1977 Protocols.28 Ini tial individual status determina-
tions were needlessly complicated by the inexplicable US view that the fight against 
the Taliban was an armed conflict, yet was neither a Common Article 2 nor Com-
mon Article 3 confli ct.29 Despite warnings from the US Secretary of StatelO and the 
Department of State's Legal Adviser,3l the Bush administration held that neither 
the Taliban nor al Qaeda was protected by the Geneva Conventions,12 including 
Common Article 3 protection )3 The view that captured Taliban and al Qaeda 
fighters were outside the protections of Common Article 334 was rejected by the Su-
preme Cour t in its 2006 Hamdan decision,35 and the administration subsequently 
softened its position. Lieutenant Genera! Ricardo Sanchez, former US commander 
of ground combat troops in Iraq, wrote of the presidential memorandwn denying 
the Taliban the protections of the Geneva Conventions: 
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This presidential memorandum constituted a watershed event in U.S. military history. 
Essentially, it set as ide all of the legal constraints, training guidelines, and rules fo r 
interrogation that formed the U.S. Army's foundation for the t reatment of prisoners 
on the battlefield .. . . According to the President, it was now okay to go beyond those 
standards with regard to al-Qaeda terrorists. And that guidance set America on a path 
toward torture.:l6 
If not covered by the Geneva Conventions, even Common Article 3, what, in the 
pre-Hamdan US view, was the status of captured Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, 
and what treatment were they to be accorded? The murky answer was provided by 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld: "The Combatant Commanders shall, in 
detaining Al Qaeda and Taliban individuals under the control of the Department 
of Defense, treat them humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with 
military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949."37 No individual status was specified. A forme r Assistant US At-
torney General wrote, "This formulation sounded good. But it was very vague, it 
was not effectively operationalized into concrete standards of conduct, and it left 
all of the hard issues about 'humane' and 'appropriate' treatment to the discretion 
of unknown officials. "3$ Nor was it consistent with the law of armed conflict. 
Captured Taliban were dubbed "enemy combatants." That phrase first ap-
peared in the US Supreme Court opinion in the World War II Nazi saboteur case, 
Ex parte Quirin. Chief Justice Stone wrote for the majority: 
[A spy or] an enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines 
for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property, are familiar examples 
of belligerents who are generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of 
war, but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by 
military tribunals.39 
Sixty-five years later, critics of Quirin note of the Court's phrase, "enemy combat-
ant," that "the term's meaning is blurred by its failure to appear in the positive case 
law existing at the time of the case as well as in the current treaty-based law of 
war."4O Another critic dismissively asserts that« [t]he concept of the 'unlawful com-
batant' was invented to explain the legal fate of the eight German saboteurs tried in 
Quirin . ... The concept ... explained why the saboteurs were entitled neither to a 
jury trial under the Constitution nor to POW status under the Hague Conven-
tion."4l Although Quirin continues to be cited when supportive of a writers' posi-
tion, the opinion is muddled, and a poor example of LOAC insight that lacks legal 
clarity. 
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Canadian Brigadier General Kenneth Watkin writes, "[C1onfusion has also 
been created by the United States' use of an even more generic term: 'enemy com-
batants."'42 Colonel Charles Garraway agrees: 
The term ~enemycombatant" ... merely adds to the confusion. Traditionally, the term 
~enemycombatant" refers to legitimate combatants who are entitled to prisoner of war 
status. It is a new usage to describe those who are deemed to be unlawful belligerents as 
such. What term is left for those legitimate combatants belonging to enemy armed 
forces?43 
Today, "enemy combatant," like the term "combatant" itself, has come to rep-
resent a status rather than an activity. A definition of "enemy combatant" binding 
US Armed Forces is found in a Department of Defense (DoD) directive: "Enemy 
combatant. In general, a person engaged in hostili ties against the United States or 
its coalition partners during an armed conflict. The term 'enemy combatant' in-
cludes both 'lawful enemy combatants' and <unlawful enemy combatants."'44 No 
mention is made of the treatment due a captured enemy combatant and the defini-
tion appears tailored for the "war on terrorism," rather than for general LOAC use. 
Its melding of lawful and unlawful combatants, long-established separate LOAC 
statuses, is also notable since, upon capture in a Common Article 2 conflict, the two 
are enti tled to significantly diffe ring protections. Whether this defini tion survives 
to become State practice, or the subject of treaties, remains to be seen. 
A competing US directive, loint Publication 3-63, adopts the just-mentioned 
DoD directive's definition but, significantly, omits its last sentence: "Enemy com-
batant. In general, a person engaged in hostilities against the United States or its co-
alition partners during an armed conflict. "4$ Again, the loint Publication's 
definition does not mention the captive' s individual status (unless "enemy com-
batant" is considered a discrete status), or presumptive POW status or protected 
person status, one or the other of which must be applicable in a Common Article 2 
conflict. In Afghanistan, the United States has been at pains to avoid referring to 
captured opposing fighters as POWs. The unsatisfactory term "enemy combatant" 
is instead used. 
Taxonomic issues aside, Operation Enduring Freedom continued, its partici-
pants oblivious to status issues. On November 16,2001, the battle of Tara Bora be-
gan. In support of Afghan warlord Hazrat Ali, dozens of US SF operators guided 
airstrikes on al Qaeda mountain strongholds. Although the constant strikes and 
pressure from ground forces reduced the enemy presence, fighting came to a halt 
in mid-December. Most of the enemy had either fough t to the death or had found 
refuge across the Pakistan border.46 
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Also in November, at Tarin Kot, US aircraft: guided by SF ground controllers 
dedmated Taliban fighters, killing an estimated one thousand. On November 25, 
the first US conventional forces entered Afghanistan when five hundred Marines 
of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) debarked from USS Peleiiu and 
landed at Kandahar. They had moved by helicopter from their shipboard base four 
hundred miles inland to Kandahar, so distant an inland objective not being the 
usual Marine ship-to-shore movement. The 15th MEU departed a few weeks later, 
replaced by the 26th MEU,~7 who themselves departed within two months. On the 
ground, Afghanistan was still essentially an SF/Northern Alliance show. 
Also, on November 25, 200 1, during a riot at a prison located at Mazar-e Sharif, 
CIA Special Activities Division officer Johnny M. Spann was the first American 
killed by Taliban enemy action.4I! 
Un manned Aerial Vehicles and Targeted Killing 
Operation Enduring Freedom is notable for the use of unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs). Their role in ground combat has been significant because at least one 
UAY, the MQ-l Predator, can carry and fire two laser-guided air- to-ground Hell-
fire missiles, changing the fundamental nature of ground combat when it is 
employed. 
Predator UAYs first deployed to the Balkans in 1995. Since then, the Predator's 
offensive capabilities have increased. Today, it carries a daytime television nose 
camera, a forward-looking infrared camera for low-light and night operations, and 
a laser designator. Cruising at eighty-five miles per hour at 25,000 feet, a Predator 
can loiter for in excess of forty hours.~9 The first armed Predator mission in Af-
ghanistan was flown on October 7, 200 1. 
Employing the Predator, the US admitted engaging in targeted killing for the first 
time.so On November 3, 2002, over the desert near Sana, Yemen, a CIA-controlled 
Predator tracked an SUV co ntaining six men. One of the six, Qaed Salim Sinan 
al-Harethi, was believed to be a senior al Qaeda lieutenant who had played a major 
role in the 2000 bombing of the American destroyer USS Cole. He "was on a list of 
'high-value' targets whose elimination, by capture or death, had been called for by 
President Bush."sl The United States and Yemen had tracked al-Harethi's move-
ments for months. Now, away from any inhabited area, the Predator fired a Hell-
fire missile at the vehicle. Its six occupants, including al- Harethi, were killed.52 
There is no consensus definition of "targeted killing" in the LOAC or in case law.53 
However, a reasonable definition is offered by International Committee of the Red 
Cross (JeRe) legal advisor Nils Melzer: "The use of lethal force attributable to a 
subject of international law with the intent, premeditation and deliberation to 
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kill individually selected persons who are not in the physical custody of those tar-
geting them."54 
Additional Protocol I, Article 51.3, usually considered to be customary law, ap-
pears to prohibit targeted killing: "Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by 
this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities." Those 
interested in international law or the LOAC know that for several years the phrase 
"unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities" has been the sub-
ject of debate and the focus of meetings of international experts sponsored by the 
ICRC and the Asser Institute.S5 The plain meaning of the phrase indicates that ter-
roristsand terrorist accomplices, such as weapon makers and communications ex-
perts, cannot lawfully be targeted unless, at the time of targeting, they are actually 
directly engaged in hostilities. Those who argue against such a constricting limita-
tion urge that such terrorists should be lawful targets whenever and wherever their 
locations can be confirmed. 
But events on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq are making the debate moot. 
As Melzer notes: 
Today, targeted killing is in the process of escaping the shadowy realm of half- legality 
and non-accountability, and [is] gradually gaining legitimacy as a method of counter-
terrorism and "surgical" warfare. Several Governments have expressly or implicitly 
acknowledged that they have resorted to targeted killings in thei r respective efforts to 
curb insurgent or terrorist activities.56 
Those governments include the United States, Israel, Russia, Pakistan, the United 
Kingdom, Germany and Switzerland. 
For better or worse, in the United States the 9-11 attacks caused shifts in public 
opinion, and often shifts in public policy, relating to terrorism and terrorists. For 
example, torture, previously rejected out of hand, shockingly became acceptable. A 
2005 sUlVey indicated that sixty-one percent of the American public would not rule 
out torture,S7 and President George W. Bush said in a nationally televised address 
that "the CIA used an alternative set of procedures"sa when interrogating certain 
captured terrorist suspects. 
Another post-9-11 change in policy and attitude related to targeted killing. 
Once anathema to America (in public at least),59 after 9- 11 targeted killing became 
tolerated/,o then embraced. Under a series of classified presidential findings, Presi-
dent Bush reportedly broadened the number of named terrorists who may be killed 
if their capture is impracticaL 61 In early 2006, it was reported that since 9- 11 the US 
had successfully carried out at least nineteen targeted killings via Predator-Hred 
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Hellfi re missiles. In June 2006, the targeted killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 
leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, was celebrated as a US strategic and political victory. 
In October 2001, a US Predator killed the military chief of al Qaeda in Afghani-
stan. In June 2004, a senior Taliban planner, Nek Mohammad, was killed bya UAV-
launched missile. In May 2005, on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, a ClA-controUed 
UA V killed Haitham al-Yemeni, a suspected senior figure in Afghan al Qaeda opera-
tions.6l In August 2008, an Afghan warlord 's camp in the mountains of Pakistan 
was destroyed and nine insurgents reportedly killed by four missiles.6) The roster 
continues to lengthen. Though it occasionally admits to targeted killing, the US 
government remains reticent and evasive in acknowledging employment of the 
tactic, but its value to ground com bat operations is apparent.64 
Even considering their inevitable collateral damage, the effectiveness of UAVs 
mated with H ellfire m issiles, combined with their relatively low cost and zero 
exposure of friendly personnel, assures their continued use. Although targeting 
errors, actual or contrived, are media staples,6s the international trend toward 
their legitimization, whether or not seen to be in compliance with Article 51.3, is 
all but assured. 
Meanwhile, in April 2002, coalition members met in Geneva and agreed on five 
"pillars" of change in Afghanistan. The United States assumed responsibility for 
building the Afghan army; Germany agreed to build the Afghan police; Italy took 
on the judicial system; the United Kingdom was to take the lead on curbing illegal 
drug use; and Japan accepted responsibility for disarmament, demilitarization and 
rein tegration of the Afghan warlords and militias.66 Six years on, one can only 
smile ruefully at such ambitious plans. 
By late 2002 an Afghanistan conflict timeline was discernable. The US invasion 
was in October 200 1. Coalition forces removed the Taliban from power in Decem-
ber.67 According to the 200 I Afghan Bonn Agreement, Afghan sovereignty re-arose 
in December 200 1 with the establishment of the In terim Authority.68 Accepting 
those dates, the international armed conflict phase of the "war" lasted sixty-two 
days and the US occupation a mere fifteen days. In June 2002 the Afghans created a 
transitional govern ment referred to as a LoyaJirga, or grand assembly. 
In terms of ground combat, one observer noted that " [d [ u ty in Afghanistan isn't 
turning out to be the low-key operation many expected. "69 An infantry officer re-
ported, "Afghanistan is home to some of the most extreme terrain and environ-
mental conditions in the world. During our time there we operated in mostly 
mountainous terrain in excess of 8,000 feet [above J mean sea level, with tempera-
tures ranging during the day from 80 to 100 degrees."7o 
Through 2003 Afghanistan's stresses on troop availability were reflected in tour 
lengths: Army tours of duty were from nine to twelve months; Marine Corps units 
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rotated into and out of country every seven months; Air Force personnel rotated 
every three or four months. Five years later, manning levels and tour lengths con-
tinue to bedevil Pentagon planners. 
Transfer of Protected Perwns from Afghanistan to Guan tanamo Bay 
During the Newport workshop, several of us wondered why more has not been 
made of the movement of prisoners from Afghanistan and Iraq to Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba. The history of deportations in armed conflicts is familiar. During 
World War I Germany deported thousands of French and Belgian citizens to Ger-
many as forced laborers. The German action was called "an act of tyranny, contrary 
to all notions of humanity."71 Georg Schwarzenberger wrote: "In World War II, 
Nazi Germany resorted to deportation as part of its policies ofterrorisation and ex-
termination and, even more so, for the purpose of implementing its slave-labour 
programme."n In response, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg specified that the deportation of civilians from occupied territories-
for any purpose-was a crime against humanity and a breach of the laws and cus-
toms ofwar.73 In the post-war "Subsequent Proceedings," tried under authority of 
Control Council Law No. 10, unlawful deportation was among the charges in sev-
eral of the twelve military tribunals. National tribunals prosecuted individuals for 
deportation as well. 7~ 
Article 49 of Geneva Convention IV addresses the removal of protected persons: 
"Individual .. . transfers, as well as deportation of protected persons from occupied 
territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, 
occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive. .. "75 
The Commetltary to Convention IV explains, "There is doubtless no need to give 
an account here of the painful recollections called forth by the 'deportations' of the 
Second World War .... The prohibition ... is intended to forb id such hateful prac-
tices for all time .... The prohibition is absolute and allows of no exceptions .... "76 
How then to explain the history of forced movement of individuals from Afghani-
stan and Iraq to Guantanamo in the "war against terrorism"? 
In non-international conflicts, Additional Protocol II mandates that 
"[cJ ivilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons con-
nected with the conflict."77 The Statute of the International Criminal Court76 ren-
ders deportations in non-international conilicts a war crime as well, while the 
statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICfY) 
and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda denominate deportations as 
crimes against humanityJ9 
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The JCRe's study, Customary lntertlational Humanitarian Law, states, "Numer-
ous military manuals specify the prohibition of unlawful deportation or transfer of 
civilians in occupied territol)'."80 The study goes on to specify the legislation of 
thirty-nine States, several applicable in non-international conflicts, making depor-
tation of civilians a domestic offense. The ICRC study finds State practice to estab-
lish the rule against deportation, in both international and non-international 
armed conflicts, as customary internationallaw.81 Finally, Geneva Convention IV 
mandates that "[pJrotected persons accused of offenses shall be detained in the oc-
cupied country, and if convicted they shall serve their sentences there. "82 
These prohibitory sources against deportation indicate the incontrovertible na-
ture of the prohibition. Throughout the armed conflict in Afghanistan and the US 
occupation, Article 49 applied, prohibiting the deportation of protected persons 
from the occupied State to Guantanamo. 
Who is a "protected person" whose deportation is prohibited? Geneva 
Convention IV, Article 4, tells us that, essentially, a protected person is someone in 
an international armed conflict, other than a POW, who is in the hands of the other 
side. There are limitations on the application of protected person status, of course-
notably the "nationality requirement" and cobelligerents. The cobelligerent's re-
quirement of diplomatic representation is significant,83 because at the time of the 
armed conflict with the United States, the Taliban government did not have such 
relations with the United States. The nationality and cobelligerent limitations on 
protected person status did not apply to nationals of Afghanistan vis-a-vis the 
United States. 
Can extraordinary measures, such as deportation, be taken in the case of unlaw-
ful combatants, as many Afghan insurgents were? The "unprivileged belligerent" 
has been characterized by the ICRC "as describing all persons taking a direct part in 
hostilities without being entitled to do so and who therefore cannot be classified as 
prisoners of war on falling into the power of the enemy."84 
Dinstein argues that 
[al person who engages in military raids by night. while purporting to be an innocent 
civilian by day, is neither a civilian nor a lawful combatant. He is an unlawful 
combatant. He is a combatant in the sense that he can be lawfully targeted by the 
enemy, but he cannot claim the privileges appertaining to lawful combatancy. Nor 
does he enjoy the benefits of civilian status . 8S 
Captured unlawful combatants are enti tled to the basic humanitarian 
protections of Common Article 3 and of Article 75 of Additional Protocol 1.86 
While being an unprivileged belligerent is not a war crime, the unlawful combatant 
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forfeits the combatant's privilege and potential POW status, and may be charged 
for law of war violations that made him an unlawful combatant. 
What is "deportation" in the LOAC? William Schabas states that 
[d Jeportation ... involves the movement of individuals. under duress, from where they 
reside to a place that is not of their choosing. Deportation would involve such transfer 
when an international border is crossed. It must be proven that the accused 
intentionally perpetrated an act or omission to effect such deportation .. . that was not 
motivated by the security of the population or imperative military reasons.87 
ICfY jurisprudence defines deportation simply as forcible transfer beyond one's 
home State borders,u and finds it an inhumane act.89 
In the pertinent timeframe, the seventy-seven-day-long US-Afghanistan con-
flict , whose deportation to Guantanamo Bay was prohibited? Answer: captured 
unlawful combatants who were nationals of a State other than Afghanistan and, be-
cause Afghanistan lacked normal diplomatic relations with the United States, 
Afghan nationals held by the United States in occupied Afghanistan who were al-
legedly unlawful combatants. Individuals in both categories were protected 
persons. 
The only discovered US government document addressing deportations to 
Guantanamo is a March 2004 draft opinion written by the Justice Department's 
Office of Legal Counsel. The fo urteen-page memorandum to Alberto Gonzales, 
then-Counse1 to the President, is enti tled "Permissibility of Relocating Certain 
'Protected Persons' from Occupied Iraq."90 Relying on a definition of deportation 
taken from Roman times, the draft memorandum argues that Geneva Convention 
IV does not prohibit the deportation of protected persons who are illegal aliens-
presumably meaning foreign fighters--<ap tured in Iraq. Creating the LOAC from 
whole cloth, the memorandum argues that protected persons, even if nationals of 
the State in which captured, may be deported as long as they have not been for-
mally accused of wrongdoing, apparently an effort to circumvent the requirement 
of Article 76 of the Fourth Convention that protected persons accused of offenses 
be detained in the occupied State. 
The draft memorandum's conclusion is that the United States may remove-
deport-protected persons when the intent is not to accuse them of wrongdoing 
but only to interrogate them. From the memorandum: "[AJ rtide 49(1 )'s prohibi-
tion of forcible transfers and deportations out of occupied territory ... should not 
be construed to extend to temporary transnational relocations of brief but not in-
definite duration" (emphasis in original). This would allow authori ties to simply 
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designate a protected person as destined for interrogation and deport him without 
further accountability. 
The draft memorandum was never finalized,91 although its conclusions were 
confirmed by Mr. Gonzales when he was nominated to be Attorney General of the 
United States.9l "A related issue that has inexplkably escaped broader attention is 
the fate of persons apprehended in the 'war on terrorism' who were or are being 
held at undisclosed locations. '>93 The draft memorandum was the basis for the se-
cret removal by the CIA of at least a dozen detainees from Iraq.94 
How many Afghan and Iraqi prisoners held by the United States were deported 
to Guantanamo in contravention of Article 49? It is unlikely there will ever be a sat-
isfactory answer. 
Increased War Crimes Prosecutions---Perception or Fact? 
Large-scale ground operations in Afghanistan, e.g., the US Army's Operations An-
aconda (March 1-16,2002), Valiant Strike (March 20-25, 2(03) and Mountain Vi-
per (September 4-5, 2003), do not usually give rise to charges ofLOAC violations. 
Day-to-day operations in urban Afghan settings, however, have seen many such al-
legations. War crime charges are even more frequent in Iraq, where urban opera-
tions are more common. 
Anytime a government puts high-power weapons in the hands of very young 
men and women, bad things will inevitably happen.9s In fighting terrorists who ig-
nore customary battlefield norms, incite retaliation and hide within the noncom-
batant population, the spur for opposing forces to commit offenses is only 
heightened. The "CNN factor" often ensures that offenses are broadcast worldwide 
in near-real time. The armed forces are in a difficult position: fail to formallyinves-
tigate even flimsy allegations of wrongdoing and be pilloried for covering up war 
crimes, or prefer court-martial charges with slim evidence and be pilloried as 
overly aggressive martinets. 
But one may ask, as some workshop attendees did around Naval War College 
luncheon tables, have LOAC violations actually increased in Afghanistan, or have 
their reporting and prosecution increased? Are US armed forces members less con-
trolled today or has a heightened awareness of the law of armed conflict resulted in 
greater command awareness and increased prosecutions? Either way, anecdotal ev-
idence suggests that there have been proportionally more courts-martial for 
LOAC-related offenses than in previous armed conflicts. 
One cannot obtain accurate numbers of courts-martial for such violations. Each 
of the military Servkes annually reports total numbers of convictions (as opposed 
to charges) to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, but the convictions are 
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not broken down by offense. Even if they were, the murder of a POW, for example, 
would simply be reported as a murder, with no victim, no grave breach and no 
LOAC violation indicated. There is no requirement in federal law or military regu-
lation to do otherwise.96 Nor are media reports reliable indicators of indiscipline or 
criminality. 
In December 2004 the Department of Defense reported that 130 US combatants 
had been punished or charged with prisoner abuse in Afghanistan, Iraq or 
Guantanamo.97 Numbers in other reports for specific geographic areas vary.98 In 
any event, there is no base point to which any number may be compared. Is 130 an 
unusually high nwnber or normal or unusually low? Figures recorded in the cur-
rent conflict cannot be compared to similar offenses in prior conflicts because, 
even ifnumbers had been kept-and they were not---everycon l1ict is unique, with 
fundamentally different conflict characteristics that would make comparisons 
meaningless. 
In both Afghanistan and Iraq there have clearly been a disturbingly high num-
ber of deaths of detainees at the hands of US warders. The New York Times re-
ported: "At least 26 prisoners have died in American custody in Iraq and 
Afghanistan since 2002 in what Army and Navy investigators have concluded or 
suspect were acts of criminal homicide, according to military officials. '>99 A few 
months later the Los Angeles Times reported that "[aJutopsy reports on 44 prison-
ers who died in US custody in Iraq and Afghanistan indicate that 21 were victims of 
homicide, incl uding eight who appear to have been fatally abused by their cap-
tors."IOO And a few months after that the Philadelphia Inquirer reported: "Ninety-
eight detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan have died in US custody since August 2002, 
and 34 of them were suspected or confirmed homicides, a hwnan-rights group re-
ported yesterday. Only 12 cases have resulted in punishment of any kind .. . . "11)1 
Which media figures, all said to be based on armed forces figures, can be relied 
upon-if any? 
There are media reports of combatant misconduct occurring in Afghanistan, 
most involving detainee mistreatmentl02 but not all. A closely watched case arose 
in March 2007 in Jalalabad, when it was reported that ten to nineteen Afghan non-
combatants were killed (the actual nwnber has never been settled) and thirty-three 
more wounded by uncontrolled US fire when a Marine Corps convoy was hit by a 
car bomb that slightly wounded one Marine. As the convoy sped from the scene it 
allegedly continued to fire on Afghan civilians over the course of a six-mile "escape." 
The area's Army commander immediately ordered the Marine unit out of the coun-
try, initiated an investigation, paid $2,()(H) in compensation for each reported death 
and apologized to the victims and their families on behalf of the United States. The 
Marine commander of the convoy unit was relieved by his Marine O:lrps seniors. At 
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the same time the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James Conway, pub-
licly expressed his anger at the Army commander's expressions of regret and accep-
tance of responsibility, which General Conway considered premature. The 
involved Marines disputed the initial account, insisting they had only returned fire 
after the initial car bombing and subsequent lengthy escape. IO} 
In May 2008, a court ofinquiry cleared all Marines involved of criminal charges. 
In a fourteen-month arc the incident moved from newspaper front pages to back 
pages to silence, leaving hard feelings between the Marines and the Army, and Af-
ghans distrustful and embittered against the United States. If not typical, it was a 
not uncommon progression, initially raising the specter of Haditha-like horrific 
unlawful conduct, fading to anticlimax and no charges. 
There have indeed been numerous courts-martial involving war crime charges 
and there have been instances in which prosecution was fou nd unwarranted. There 
have been convictions in which sentences were not commensurate with the of-
fenses of which the accused was convicted . 11M All that can be said with assurance is 
that, after seven years in Afghanistan, there is no documented answer to the ques-
tion of whether there are more LOAC violations than in prior conflicts; only argu-
ments. Several attendees suggested the Department of Defense should require that 
all formal allegations of violent offenses involving indigenous individuals and 
armed service personnel, including prisoners of any description, whether or not re-
sulting in trial, be periodically reported by the armed Service involved to a com-
mon DoD authority. 
Meanwhile, in mid-2006 the US Marine Corps departed Afghanistan, leaving 
ground fighting to the Army and NATO combatants, and fledgling Afghan Na-
tional Army troops. The Marine units would move on to Iraq. One observer noted: 
"The end of the Corps' Afghan deployments comes as the overall U.S. commitment 
to that country is on the decline. Military officials have said that American forces 
will be reduced from the roughly 23,000 troops there now to 16,000 by the end of 
the summer [of2006]. "lOS Planning was underway for the so-called "surge" in Iraq, 
which began in February 2007. Even at some tactical cost, US troop drawdowns in 
Afghanistan were required to meet the manpower needs of the coming "surge." By 
2007, Afghanistan was being referred to as the "forgotten war."I06 But, once the 
surge was over, the Marines were back,107 to the consternation of the Marine 
Corps' Commandant. los But, almost immediately, new plans were announced in-
dicating they would yet again leave Afghanistan, this time within a year. 109 Such 
undulating personnel requirements, presenting planners with constantly moving 
targets, are one more price of fighting two wars at once. 
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Conclusion 
After more than seven years of ground combat in Afghanistan, at the cost of more 
than nine hundred lives, well over five hundred of them American, and having 
spent in excess of $ 175 billion, I IO where are we? 
We have succeeded in deposing the Taliban government and installing an 
elected parliament. We have disrupted al Qaeda in Afghanistan. There has been a 
major increase in availability of basic health care. A central banking system and a 
stable currency are in place. Yet, mid-2008 reports, not all of which are media-
based, present a discouraging picture. Among media reports were these: "Securi ty 
in the provinces ringing the capital, Kabul, has deteriorated rapidly in recent 
months. Today it is as bad as at any time since the beginning of the war .... " 111 
"[T Jhe Taliban are demonstrating a resilience and a ferocity that are raising alarm 
here [in Kabul], in Washington and in other NATO capitals."112" A1 Qaeda is more 
capable of attacking inside the United States than it was last year .... "113 "There 
were ten times as many armed attacks on international troops and civilian contrac-
tors in 2007 as there were in 2004. Every other measure of violence, from roadside 
bombs to suicide bombers, is also up dramatically."114In April 2006, a National In-
telligence Estimate reported that "the global jihadist movement ... is spreading 
and adapting to counterterrorism efforts. "115 In 2007, the last year for which totals 
are available, enemy encounters, roadside bombs, suicide bombers and casualty 
figures all reached new highs. In 2008, the Baltimore Stln reported: "The chairman 
of the House Armed Services Committee, Democratic Rep. Ike Skelton of Mis-
souri, has said the United States ' risks strategic failure' in Afghanistan."116 
Poppy crop eradication, once a primary US mission in Afghanistan, has been 
abandoned. The media has reported that "[t]he Marines don't want to antagonize 
the local population by joining US-backed efforts to destroy the crop. 'We're not 
coming to eradicate poppy,' [a Marine major] says. 'We're coming to dear the 
Taliban."'1l1 
An open Pakistan border combines with Pakistani perfidy and Afghan exhaus-
tion to undercut coalition efforts against a resurgent Taliban. The invasion of Iraq 
eclipsed Afghanistan as the battleground against terrorism, stripping it of military 
resources, American funding and public interest. So far, efforts to deny sanctuary 
to terrorists in Afghanistan have been unsuccessful. One reporter alleges: " In a vi-
cious cycle, narcotics, corruption and the absence of law and order are rotting the 
heart of the government and rippling the economy. Despite massive Western in-
vestment, Afghanistan is close to being a failed state. "118 
An August 2008 editorial in the New York Times reflected the widespread con-
cern regarding the progress of Operation Enduring Freedom: 
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The news out of Mghanistan is truly alarming. ... Taliban and foreign Qaeda fighters 
are consolidating control over an expanding swath of territory sprawling across both 
sides of the porous Mghanistan-Pakistan border . .. . Unless the United States, NATO 
and its central Asian allies move quickly, they could lose this war .... [sJeven years have 
already been wasted . .. . Mghanistan's war is not a sideshow. It is the principal military 
confrontation between America and NATO and the forces responsible for 9/11 . ... 119 
Seven years of ground combat in Afghanistan have not gained control of Afghani-
stan's borders, which is critical to ultimate success. The Afghan government has 
not yet established its authority or credibility. The Taliban are far from defeated. 
The United States is not at the point of taking Kipling's advice to "' est roll to 
your rifle and blowout your brains An' go to your Gawd like a soldier." But there is 
a large measure of ground combat yet to come in Afghanistan. 
Notes 
I. Gerry J. Gilmore, Pentagon Proposes Change to U.s. Command Structure in Mghani-
stan (Aug. 8, 2008), available at http: //W"WW.defenselink.millnewsfnewsarticle.aspx?id=507 48. 
2. Extremist Movements and Their Threat to the Un ited States, Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Near East and Soutll Asian Affairs of tire S. Foreign ReIatio1f5 Comm., 100th Cong. 3 (1999) 
(sta tement of Amb. Michael A. Sheehan, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US Dept. of State), 
available at http://www.state.gov/W"WW/policy_remarks! 199919911 02_sheehan_terrorism.hrml. 
3. Address by President George W. Bush, The War Against Terrorism, in D1GfSfOF UNITED 
STATES PRAcrtCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 856-58 (SallyCwnmins& David Stewarteds., 2001). 
4. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRfSSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 31 (4th ed. 2005). 
5. ld. 
6. S.c. Res. 1386,1 3, U.N. Doc. S/RESl 1386 (Dec. 20, 2001) . 
7. Richard W. Stewart. The United States Army in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Free-
dom, October 200 I-March 2002, at 8 (2003), available at http://www.history.army.millbrochuresf 
MghanistanJOperation%20Enduring%20Freedom.htm. 
8. DoUGLAS J. FEITH, WAR AND DEOSION 104 (2008) . Feith notes that there may have 
been Central Intelligence Agency paramilitary personnel on the ground in Afghanistan before 
October 19. 
9. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field art . 2, Aug. 12,1 949,6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Con-
vention I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.s.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention 1II ); and 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949,6 
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV): all reprillted in J:Xx:UMENTS 
ON THE LAWS OF WAR (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3ded. 2000) at 197, 222, 244 and 
301, respectively. Article 2 provides in pertinent part that uthe p resent Convention shall apply to 
all cases of declared war or of any other armed conf1ict which may arise between two or more of 
the H igh Contracting Parties,~ i.e., in ternational armed conflict. 
237 
Law of War Issues in Ground Hostilities in Afghanistan 
10. Geneva Conventions I, II , III and IV, supra note 9, art . 3. Article 3 applies to all cases "of 
armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High 
Contacting Parties, n i.e., non-in ternational armed conflict. 
II. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONOUer OF HOSTIUTIF.S UNDER THE LAw OF INTERNA. 
TIONAL ARMEDCONFLlCl" 14 (2004). 
12. Stewart, supra note 7, at 16. 
13. FEITH, supra note 8, at 165. 
14. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 43(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 
reprinted in DocUMENTS ON THE LAWS Of WAR, supra note 9, at 422 [hereinafter Addi tional 
Protocol I]. Sre also Geneva Convention I, supra note 9, art. 13(1). 
15. Marco SassOli, Query: Is 77Iere a Statw of "Unlawful Combatmlt"?, in ISSUES IN INTERNA· 
TIONAL LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 57,61 (Richard B. Jaquesed., 2006) (VoL 80, US Naval 
War College International Law Stud ies). 
16. WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OFTHE THIRD REICH 33-34, 42-43 (1960). 
17. Posting of John B. Bellinger, Unlawful Enemy Combatants (Jan. 15, 2007), to http:// 
opiniojuris.orglauthorljohn-bellinger/. 
18. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CON· 
VENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 508 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmer· 
mann eds., 1987). 
19. Geneva Convention III , supra note 9, art. 4A(I). 
20. Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report 
of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, U.N. GAOR, 
56th $ess .• Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. Al56/l0 (2001), available at http://untreaty.un.orglilcltextsl 
instrumentslenglishfdraft%20articlesf9_6_2001 .pdf. Article 10 continues, "[t[ he conduct of an 
insurrectional movement which becomes the new Government of a State shall be considered an 
act of that State under international law." Article 11 adds, "[c[onduct which is not attributable to 
a State under the preceding articles shall nevertheless be considered an act of that State under in· 
ternationallaw if and to the extent that the State acknowledges and adopts the conduct in ques· 
tion as its own." These articles appear to fairly encompass the Taliban's relation to the State of 
Afghanistan. 
21. Geneva Convention Ill , supra note 9, art. 4A( I ). 
22. DINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 48. Footnote omitted. 
23. Marco Sassoli argues, "This allegation may astonish those who remember that during 
Operation Enduring Freedom, the United States stressed that it attacked Taliban command and 
control centers and did not complain that it was impossible to distinguish the Tal iban from civil · 
ians." Sassbli, supra note 15, at 61; see also Jennifer Elsea, Congressional Research Service, Treat-
mentof"&ttlefield Detainees" in tire War 011 Terrorism (Jan. 13,2005), at 7; Robert K. Goldman 
& Brian D. Tittemore, Unprivileged Combatants and tire Hostilitie.s in Afghanistan: Their Status 
and Rights Under Jnternatiolral Humanitarian and Human Rigllts Law, ASIL TASK FORCE PAPERS 
(American Society of International Law), Dec. 2002, at 23-31, available at http://www.pegc.usI 
archive/Joumals/goldman.pdf; George H. Aldrich, Editorial Comments, Tile Taliban, AI Qaeda, 
alld tire Determination of JUegal Combatants, 96 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL U.W 
891,894 (2002). 
24. Geneva Convention III , supra note 9, art. 5; Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 
45.1 . George Aldrich writes, 
Without a doubt, the mosl difficult element to defend of the decisions made .. . with 
respect: to the prisoners taken in Afghanistan is the blanket nature of the d ecision to 
238 
Gary D. Solis 
deny POW status to the Taliban prisoners. By one sweeping detennination, the 
president ruled that not a single Taliban soldier, presumably not even the anny 
commander, could qualify for POW status u nder the Geneva Convention. 
Aldrich, supra note 23, at 897. 
25. Geneva Convention 1II, supra note 9, art 5. 
26. Elsea, supra note 23, at 7. 
27. Aldrich, supra note 23, at 893 e lts methods brand it asa criminal organization underna-
tionallaws and as an international outlaw") . 
28. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 9, art. 33, Addi tional Protocol I, supra note 14, 
art. 51.2; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims oCNon-ln ternationai Armed Conflicts arts. 4(2)(d) & 13(2), June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 609, reprinted in DOCUMF.NTSONTHE LAWSOf WAR, supra note 9, at 483 [herein-
aft er Additional Protocol Ill. 
29. See Memorandum from John C. Yoo & Robert Delahunty to WiUiam J. Haynes II , Gen-
eral Counsel, Department of Defense, Re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and 
Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 
38 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua Dralel eds., 2005) (hereinafter Yoo Memoranduml (UCommon 
Article 2 . . . is limited only to cases of declared war or armed conflict 'between two or more of the 
High Contracting Parties.' Al Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party .. . Al Qaeda is not covered 
by common Artide 3, because the current confliC! is not covered by the Geneva Conventions .. .. 
Article 3 . . . shows that the Geneva Conventions were intended to cover ei ther: a) traditional 
wars between Nation States ... or non-international civil wars .... O ur conflict with al Qaeda 
doe<; not fit into either category"). The same condusion applied to the Taliban (" Artide 2 states 
that the Convention shall apply to al l cases of declared war or other armed conflict between the 
High Contracting Parties. But there was no war or anned conflict between the United States and 
Afghanistan .. . if Afghanistan was stateless at that time. No(r], of course, is there a state of war or 
armed conflict between the United States and Afghanistan now). And "[elven if Afghanistan un-
der the Taliban were not deemed to have been a failed State, the President could still regard the 
Geneva Conventions as temporarily suspended during the current military action." 
30. See Memorandum from Colin L. Powell to Counsel to the President & Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs, Draft Decision Memorandwn for the President on the 
Applicability of the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan (Jan. 26, 2002), reprinted 
in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 29, at 122. 
31. Memorandum from WiUiam H. Taft IV, Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Counsel 
to the President, Conunents on Your Paper on the Geneva Convention (Feb. 2, 2002), reprinted 
in id. at 129. 
32. Yoo Memorandum, supra note 29 ("The weight of infonned opinion strongly supports 
the condusion that . . . Afghanistan was a 'failed State' whose terri tory had been largely overrun 
and held by violence by a militia or faction rather than by a government. Accordingly, Afghani-
stan was without the attributes of sta tehood necessary to continue as a party to the Geneva Con-
ventions, and the Taliban militia[,] like al Qaeda, is therefore not entitled to the protections of 
the Geneva Convention"). 
33. Memorandwn from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, & 
WiUiam J. Haynes II , General Counsel ofthe Department of Defense, Re: Application of Treaties 
and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 22, 2002), reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra 
note 29, at 81 ("Further, common Artide 3 addresses only non-international conflicts that occur 
with in the terri tory of a single sta te party, again, like a civil war. This provision would not reach 
239 
Law of War Issues in Ground Hostilities in Afghanistan 
an anned conflict in which one of the parties operated from mul tiple bases in several different 
sta tes"). 
34. Exec. Order No. 13,440, 72 Fed. Reg. 40,707 (July 24, 2007), available at http:// 
www.fas.orgfirp/offdocs/oo/eo-I3440.htm ("On February 7, 2002, 1 determined for the United 
States that members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces are unlawful enemy combat· 
ants who are not entitled to the protections that the Third Geneva Convention provides to pris· 
oners of war. I hereby reaffinn that determination . .. "). 
35. Hamdan v. Rwnsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629-31 (2006). 
36. RICARDO SANCHEZ, WISER IN BATILE 144 (2008). 
37. Memorandwn from the SecretaryofDefense to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Status ofTal iban and AI Qaeda (Jan. 19,2002). reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 29, at 
80. 
38. JACK GoLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRFSIDENCY 120 (2007). 
39. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
40. Mark D. Maxwell & Sean M. Watts, 'Unlllwful Enemy Combatant': Status, Theory of Cul-
pability, or Neither?, 5 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 19,21 (2007). 
41. Marco Sass6li, The Statu!; of Persons Held in Guantdnamo under International Humani-
tarian Law, 2 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 96, 123 (2004). 
42. Kenneth Watkin, 21st Century Conflict and International Hunulnitariiln Law: Status Quo 
or Chnnge?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFUCf: ExPLORING THE FAULnlNFS 265, 
286 (Michacl N. Schmitt & Jelena Pejic 005., 2007). 
43. Charles H. B. Garraway, 'Combatilnts' - Substilnce or Semantics?, in id., at 327. 
44. US Department of Defense, Directive 2310.01 E, The Department of Defense Detainee 
Program (Sept. 5, 2006), ilYililable at httpJ/www.dtic.millwhs/directives/corres/pdfI23100lp 
.pdf. 
45. Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff.loint Publication 3-63. Detainee Operations, at 1-4 
(2008). 
46. Stewart, supra note 7, at 10-16. 
47. Staff Report, 26th MEU Tilpped for Enduring Freedom, MARINE CORPS T1MFS (Nov. 26, 
2001), a19; Gordon Lubold, Marines Prepnre to LenveAfghanistan, MARINE CORPS T1MFS (Jan. 7, 
2002), at 10. 
48. Afghanistan's first US military killed in action was Army Sgt. 1st Qass Nathan R. Chap. 
man, killed in a January I, 2002 firefight in Pabia. 
49. For Predator characteristics, see MQ-I Predator Unmanned Aircraft System, http://www.af 
.miVfactsheetsifactsheet.asp?fslD=122; Predator RQ-I I MQ-I/ MQ·9 Reaper - Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (UAV), USA, http://www.airforce-technology.comlprojectslpredator (both last visi ted 
Feb. 24, 2(09). 
SO. It may be argued that the Vietnam War's Phoenix Program, Operation EI Dorado Can· 
yon (the 1986 bombing of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi), or the attacks on Osama Bin 
Laden in 1998 (when he was linked to the bombing of US embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nai· 
robi), consti tuted targeted killing. Those attacks may also be argued to be assassinations and at· 
tempted assassinations, mounted with political rather than tactical motives. 
51. Seymour M. Hersh, Manhunt, NEW YORKER, Dec. 23, 2002, at 66. 
52. No hold.s barred, ECONOMIST, Nov. 7,2002, at 49. 
53. There are other definitions in scholarly articles. One, for example, is ~Ip]remeditated 
killing of an individual by a government or its agents." William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, 
Targeted Killillg ilnd Assassillation: The U.S. Legal Frnmework, 37 UNIVERSITY OF RiCHMOND 
LAW REVIEW667, 671 (2003). Another is «the intentional killing of aspecific civilian who cannot 
240 
Gary D. Solis 
reasonably be apprehended, and who is taking a direct part in hostilities, the targeting done at 
the direction and authorization of the state in the context of an in ternational or nonin terna-
tional anned conflict.» Gary D. Solis, Targeted Killingand the Lawof Armed Qmjlict, NAVAL WAR 
COllEGE REVIEW, Spring 2007, at 127, 127. 
54. NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (2008) . 
55. See, e.g., Second Expert Meeting: Direct Participation in Hostilities under International 
Humanitarian Law (Oct. 25-26, 2(04), available at http://www.icrc.orglWeb/englsiteengO.nsO 
htmlalllparticipation-hostilities-ihl-311205/SFile/Direct_participation_in_hostilities_2004_eng 
.pdf. 
56. MELZER, supra note 54, at 9-10. 
57. Will Lester, Poll Finds Support for Use of Torture in Waron Terror, WASHINGTON TIMES, 
Dec. 7,2005,atAI. 
58. See Press Release, The White House, President Discusses Creation of Military Com-
missions to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2(06), aYtlilable at http://georgewbush-whitehouse 
.archives.gov/news/releasesl2006/09120060906-3.html ("In some cases, we detennine lhat indi-
viduals we have captured pose a significant threat, or may have in telligence that we and our allies 
need .. . and they withhold infonnation lhat could save American lives. In these cases, it has been 
necessary to move these individuals to an environment where lhey can be held secretly, ques-
tioned by experts, and-when appropriate-prosecuted for terrorist acts~) . 
59. Self-licensed to kill, ECONOMIST, Aug. 4, 2001, at 12 (" Israel justifies these extra-judicial 
killings as self-defense .... Bu t lhe usual context of such a discussion would be that the two sides 
involved were at war . . . . "); Edi torial, Assassination 111 Befits Israel, NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 7, 
1997, at A24 ("[TJrying to assassinate Palestinian leaders in revenge is not the answer"). 
60. In 1989, Abraham D. Sofaer, then US State Department Legal Adviser, equivocated: 
While the U.S. regards attacks on terrorists being protected in the sovereign territory of 
other States as potentially justifiable when undertaken in self-defense, a State's ability to 
establish the legality of such an action depends on its will ingness openly to accept 
responsibility for the attack, to explain the basis for its action, and to demonstra te that 
reasonable efforts were made prior to lhe attack to convince the State whose terri torial 
sovereignty was violated to prevent the offender's unlawful activities from occurring. 
Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 
89,121 (1989). 
61. James Risen & David Johnston, Bush Has Widened Authority of C.I.A. to Kill Terrorists, 
NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 15,2002, at AI . 
62. MELZER, supra note 54, at 41, 409. 
63. Associated Press, 9 Suspected Insurgents Killed ill Missile Strike, Pakistan Says, NEW YORK 
TIMFS, Aug. 14,2008, at A7. 
64. Josh Meyer, CIA Expands Use of Drones in Terror War, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Jan. 29, 
2006, at Al ("The Predator strikes have killed at least four senior aI Qaeda leaders, but also many 
civilians, and it is not known how many times they missed their targets"). 
65. See, e.g., Candace Rondeaux, Civilum Airstrike Deaths Probed, WASHINGTON PoST, July 
25, 2008, at A12 (H78 have died in lhree incidents this month alone, Afghan officials say"); 
Carlotta Gall, British Criticize U.S. Air Attacks in Afghan Region, NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 9, 2007, 
atAI . 
66. US GoVERNMENT ACCOUNTABIUTY OFFICE, AFGHAN SECURITY: EfFORTS TO Fs"rA6-
USH ARMY AND POUCE HAVE MADE PROGRFSS. BUT FuTURE PlANS NEED TO BE BEITER DE-
FINED 5 (2005), available at http: //www.gao.gov/new.i temsld05575.pdf. 
24 1 
Law of War Issues in Ground Hostilities in Afghanistan 
67. US Department of State, Timeline - Key Eve/Its in Afghanistan's Political and Eco-
nom ic Reconstruction, Jan. 26, 2006, http://www.america.gov/stlpubs-englishl2006/1anuary/ 
2oo6012612oo12dpnosmohtO.9750482.html. 
68. Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment 
of Permanent Government Institutions, attached to Letter from the Secretary-General addressed 
to the President of the SecurityCouncil para. 1.3, U.N. Doc. S/2OOI/1154 (Dec. 5, 2001), availnble 
at http://www.afghangovernmenLcom/AfghanAgreement&nn.h tm ("Upon the official trans· 
fer of power, the Interim Authority shall be the reposi tory of Afghan sovereignty .... As such, it 
shall, throughout the interim period, represent Afghanistan in its external relations and shall oc· 
cupy the seat of Afghanistan at the Uni ted Nations .. . "). 
69. Christian Lowe, Leathernecks Aim to Take Back a Province, MARINE CORPS TIMES, June 
28, 2004, at 10. 
70. Paul Merida, Dismounted Infantry Operations, MARINE CORPS GAZE"ITE, Nov. 2004, at 
39. 
71. James W. Gamer, Contributions, Requisitions, and Compulsory Service in Occupied Terri-
tory, II AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 106 (1917). 
72. II GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFlicr 230 ( 1968). 
73. Charter of the International Military Tribunal arts. 6(b) & 6(c), Aug. 8, 1945,59 Stat. 
1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280, availnble at http://avalon.law.yaIe.edu/imtlimtconst.asp. 
74. See, e.g., Trial of Robert Wagner, Gaulei ter and Six Others (Perm. Milit. Trib. at 
Strasboug, 1946, and Ct. of Appeal, July 24, 1946), III LAw REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS 23 (UN War Crimes Commission, 1948); Trial ofJean.Pierre Lex (Perm. Milit. Tr·ib. 
at Nancy, May 13, 1946), VII LAW REPORTS OF TRlALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 23 (UN War Crimes 
Commission, 1948). 
75. Article 147 of Geneva Convention IV m akes the unlawful transfer of protected persons 
from an occupied area a grave breach, as does Additional Protocol I. Addi tional Protocol I, supra 
note 14, art . 85.4(a). 
76. COMMENTARY IV GENEVA CONVENTION REUTlVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN 
PERSONS IN TiME OF WAR 278-79 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958). 
77. Addi tional Protocol II, supra note 28, art. 17.2. 
78. Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(e), July 17, 1998,2187 U.N.T.5. 90, 
availnble at http://www.un.orgllaw/icclstatu te/romefra.htm. 
79. Statu te of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia art. 5(d), S.c. 
Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 23,1993), available at http://www.icls.de/dokumente/ 
icty_statut.pdf; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 3(d), S.c. Res. 
955, U.N. DO(. S/RFS/955 (Nov. 8, 1994), availauleat http: //www.un.orglictr/statute.html. 
80. I CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 458 (Rule 129) (Jean·Marie 
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005). The study notes that Israel argues that Article 49 
of Geneva Convention IV was not meant to apply to the deportation of selected individuals for 
reasons of public order and security, and that Article 49 is not customary in ternational law and 
contrary deportation orders under Israel i domestic law were lawfuL Id. 
81. Id. at459&457. 
82. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 9, art. 76. 
83. Article 4 of Geneva Convention IV provides in pertinent part that "nationals of a co-
beUigerent State, shall not be regarded as protected persons while the State of which they are na· 
tionals has normal diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they are." 
242 
Gary D. Solis 
84. Knut D~rmann, The Legal Sitwltion orUnlnwjullUnprivileged Combatants," 85 INTER· 
NATIONAL REVIEW Of THE RED CROSS 45 (2003). In US domestic law, in the Military Commis· 
sions Act of 2006, an unlawful combatant is defined as a person who has engaged in, or 
purposefully and materially supported another in engaging in, hostilities against the United 
States and its allies, and who does not qualify as a lawful combatant, or an individual who has 
been deemed an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or any 
other competent tribunal. Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 948 a( I), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 
120 Stat. 2600 (Oct. 17,20(6) (codified in 10 U.S.c. § 47(A». 
85. DINSTEIN, supra note II, at 29. 
86. Jelena Pejic, 'UnlnwjullEnemy Combatants': Interpretations and Consequences, ilr INTER· 
NATIONAL LAw AND ARMED CONfUCT,supra note42, at 340; Department of the Army, FM 27· 
10, The Law of Land Warfare para. 31 (1 956); UK MINISTRY Of DEfENCE, THE MANUAL Of THE 
LAW OF ARMED CONfUcr para. 9.18.1 (2004); Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, 
Judgment, para. 271 (Nov. 16, 1998). 
87. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 252-53 (2006), 
citing Prosecutor v. Naleti lic et aI., Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, paras. 519-21 (Mar. 31, 
2003). 
88. Prosecutor v. Kristic, Case No. IT -98·33-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, paras. 521, 531-
32 (Aug. 2, 2001). See also Prosecutor v. Naletilic, supra note 87, para. 519, where ~forcible trans· 
fer" is defined as Kthe movement of individuals under duress from where they reside to a place 
that is not of their choosing." 
89. Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT -97-24-T, Judgment, para. 662 (July 31, 2003). 
90. Draft Memorandum from Jack I. Goldsmith, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto R. 
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: PennissibilityofRelocating Certain KProtected Persons" 
from Occupied Iraq (Mar. 19,2004), reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 29, at 367. 
91. John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relnting to International LAw, 
Reported Removal of PrisOlrers from Iraq, 99 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 253, 
266 (2005). 
92. John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 
99 AMERICAN JOURNAL Of INTERNATIONAL LAw 479, 484 (2005). 
93. Jelena Pejic, Terrorist Acts and Groups: A Role for In ternational Law?, 75 BRITISH YEAR· 
BOOK Of INTERNATIONAL LAW 71, 94 (2004). 
94. Dana Priest, Memo Lets CIA Take Detaillees Out of Iraq, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 24, 
2004, at AI . Six of the initial detainees were Algerians captured in Bosnia and were reportedly 
turned over to the CIA. 
95. In South Vietnam, from January 1965 to March 1973,201 soldiers and 77 Marines were 
convicted by courts-martial of serious offenses against Vietnamese noncombatants. Ninety-five 
soldiers and twenty-seven Marines were convicted of murder or manslaughter of Vietnamese 
noncombatants. GUENTER I.EWY, AMERICA IN VIETNAM 324-25 (1978). 
96. During the US-Vietnam conflict, the US Anny in Vietnam, at the direction of then-Colonel 
George Prugh, the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam Staff Judge Advocate, recorded the 
numbers of I.OAC offenses referred to courts-martial. When he was transferred from theater, 
the accounting coasted to a close. See GEORGE S. PRUGH, LAW AT WAR: VIETNAM 1964-1973 
(1975). 
97. 130 Yanks Ahmed Inmates - Pentagon, DAILY NEWS (New York), Dec. 16,2004, at I. 
98. Eric Schmitt , Pentagon Officials Are Hurryilrg to Correct Conditions in Iraqi Prisons, NEW 
YORK TIMES, Sept. 9, 2004, al A14, citing III cases in Iraq. 
243 
Law of War Issues in Ground Hostilities in Afghanistan 
99. Douglas Jehl & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Military Says26 Inmate Deaths May Be Homicide, NEW 
YORK TIMES, Mar. 16,2005, atAl. 
100. John Hendren, Autopsies Support Abuse Allegatiom, Los ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 25, 2005, 
at Al. 
101. Drew Brown, Report: U.S. Detainees' Deaths Go UnaccoUlrted, PHIL-\OELPHIA INQUIRER, 
Feb. 23, 2006, at A2. 
102. Carlotta Gall , U.N. Monitor of Afghan Rights Accuses U.S. on Deterrtions, NEW YORK 
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2005, at A4; Tim Golden, Army Faltered in Investigating Detainee Abuse, NEW 
YORK TIMES, May 22, 2005, at AI; Tim Golden, Case Dropped Against U.S. Officer in Beating 
Deaths of Afghan Irrmates, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006, § 1, at 13; Tim Golden, Years After 2 
Afghans Died, Abuse Case Falters, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 13,2006, at AI; Paul von Zielbauer, 
Green Berets Face Hearing on Killing of Suspect irr Afghan Village, NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 18, 
2007, at All. 
103. Griff Witte, Marines Open FireAfter Afghan Ambush, WASHINGTON PoST, Mar. 5, 2007, 
at All; Ann Scott Tyson, Marine Unit Is Told to LruveAfglranistan, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 24, 
2007, at A 12; David S. Cloud, U.S. MilitaryOpensInquiry Into Whether Marines Killed lOAfghans 
After Arrack on Convoy, NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 24, 2007, at A6; Carlotta Gall , Mannes' Actions 
Called Excessive in Afglulnistan, NEW YORK TIMES, Apr. 15,2007, at AI; Paul von Zielbauer, 
Criminal Charges Are Expected Against Marines, Official Says, NEW YORK TIMES, Apr. 27, 2007, at 
A14; David S. Cloud, U.S. Pays and Apologizes to Kin of Afglrans Killed by Marines, NEW YORK 
TIMES, May 9, 2007, at A12; Josh White, 69 Afghans' Families Get a U.S. Apology, WASHINGTON 
POST, May9, 2007, at A12; Peter Spiegel, Apology Wrong, General Says, LOS ANGELES TIMES, May 
18,2007, at A7; Paul von Zielbauer, Marines to Conduct Inquiry Into the Killings of Afglran Civil-
ians in March, NEW YORK TIMES, O.::t. 12,2007, at AIO; Paul von Zielbauer, Marine Inquiry Into 
Afglran Killings to Look at 2 Officers, Lawyer Says, NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 21, 2007, at AIO; David 
Zucchino, Mannes Were Shot At, Army Expert Testifies, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Jan. 26, 2008, at 
A14; Thorn Shanker,Manrr es Won't Charge 2 Officers Whose Men Killed AfghansAfterCar Bomb-
ing, NEW YORK TIMES, May 24, 2008, at AS; Andrew Tilghman, No Criminal Charges, MARlNE 
CORPS TIMES, June 2, 2008, at 10. 
104. Gary Solis, Military JI/stice?, US NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, Oct. 2006, at 24. 
105. Christian Lowe, A Missiorr Ends, MARINE CORPS TIMES, May 29, 2006, at 14. 
106. See, e.g., Thomas Harding, Despatch, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), June 2, 2007, al 21; 
Nonna Greenaway, U.S. pl/blic wakens to forgotten war, Almost no debate on merits of involvement in 
Afghanistan except to brut I/p on Bush, GAZETIE (Montreal), Aug. 13, 2007, at A14; In Europe, Gates 
to pushfor NATO help in Afghanistan, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 23, 2007, § USA, at 2. 
107. Ann Scott Tyson, U.S. to Bolster Force.s in Afghanistan, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 10, 
2008, at A4 (<<The United States now provides about 26,000 of the roughly 54,000 foreign troops 
in Afghanistan and has the lead combat role in the eastern part of the count ry, while U.s. Special 
Operations forces operate in all regions. British, Canadian, Australian and Dutch forces play key 
combat roles in southern Afghanistan, where violence has surged in the past year ... "). 
lOS. Kimberly Johnson, Conway: 2-Front war will overstretch Corps, MARlNE CORPS TIMFS, 
Feb. 4, 2008, http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2008/02/marine_conway_080202/. The 
Commandant of the Marine Corps is quoted by Johnson as saying: "We can' t have one foot in 
Afghanistan and one foot in Iraq. I believe that would be-an analogy would be having one foot 
in the canoe and one foot on the bank. You can't be there long." 
109. Reuters, NATO seeks to replace U.S. Marine Afghan mission, Reuters AlertNet, June 13, 
2008, http://www.a1ertnet.orglthenewsfnewsdeskfL13 172622.htm. 
244 
Gary D. Solis 
110. Amy Balasco, Congressional Research Service, TIle Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other 
Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/1 1 Ouly 14, 2008), a t swnmary page. 
Ill. Carlotta Gall, Scars of a Deadly Insurgency Line Afgharlistan's Maill Road, NEW YORK 
TIMES, Aug. 14,2008, at AI. 
112. Carlotta Gall, Ragtag Taliban Show Tenacity in Afghanistan, NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 4, 
2008,atAI . 
113. Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Analyst Depicts AI Qaeda as Secure in Pakistan and More Potent Than 
in 2007, NEW YORK TIMES, Aug. 13,2008, at A7. 
11 4. SartJe B. Bull , The Wrong Forcefor the 'Right War, 'NEW YORK T1M£S, Aug. 14,2008, at 
A23. 
115. Press Release, National In telligence Counsel, Declassified Key Judgmentsofthe National 
Intelligence Estimate, 'Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States' dated 
April 2006, http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_KeyJudgments. pdf (last vis· 
ited Feb. 26, 2(09). 
116. David Wood, Short-Term Srr-ategies Threaten Success, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 1,2008, all. 
117. Jason Straziu$O, Narrow Mission for Marines in Lush Afghan Poppy Fields, HOUSTON 
CHRONICLE, May 3, 2008, at A24; Paul Wiseman, In Afghanistan. ManTles Begin Assault on 
Taliban, USA TODAY, Apr. 29, 2008, at 6. 
118. Rory Stewart, How to Save AfghanisMn, TIME, July 28, 2008, at 30, 32. 
119. Afglulnistan on Fire, NEW YORK T1M£S, Aug. 21, 2008, at A22. 
245 
